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The search for an optimal path of development, usually associated to the German Historical School, goes back to the Classical economists and can be traced back to the philosophers of the Enlightenment 1 . A stage approach to historical development was suggested by Adam Smith, and Karl Marx quoted twice Horace's verses to emphasise the extent to which Britain's industrialising experience forecasted the future of Germany, by then, a late comer 2 . In the post-World War II years economists became once more interested in long-term growth and turned to history searching for a laboratory of natural experiments 3 . Stylised facts, short-cuts towards the optimal path of development were explored during the Golden Age by a generation of applied, historically minded economists. 4 One of their achievements was the construction of patterns of development that rely on theoretical findings but lack an a priori model and, in the Clark/Kuznets tradition, are rooted in stylised facts. 5 It is here, where economic theorising does not provide an explanation that the contribution of economic history is more needed.
Modern Europe provides a sound basis for testing empirical regularities of growth as it offers a consistent and homogeneous set of countries which, to some extent, have shared resource endowments, institutions, and economic policies. Nonetheless, the map of Europe over the last two centuries shows, as Gerschenkron (1962, p. 353) expressively put it, 'a motley picture of countries varying with regard to the degree of their backwardness' and these initial differences have been 'of crucial significance for the nature of subsequent development' as economic structure, institutions, and ideologies all vary directly with them. 6 In this paper it is my purpose to put the existence of a common path of development in modern Europe to the test with the help of the stylised patterns of structural change designed by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) . However, Gerschenkron's (1962) emphasis on the fact that countries which had a late start would follow a different path of development with respect to early starters will be taken on board. The divergence between early starters and late comers originates in their structure of production, that results, in turn, from different institutions that substituted for the 4
In the patterns of development framework, each country is treated as an integrated, interdependent component of the international economy. Such an assumption is only acceptable in Modern Europe after mid-nineteenth century, once the basis of the liberal international order was established. By then, however, more than three centuries of mercantilism, warfare and experience with internal and imperial markets had placed the countries of Europe at rather diverse levels of development.
The patterns of development approach has been subjected to systematic criticism 12 . It has been argued that Chenery-Syrquin equations derive from an unspecified model of development in which we cannot tell supply from demand determinants. Moreover, development patterns do not reveal a unique path to industrialisation since comparative advantage, policy and institutions matter. A country's trade and production patterns, as Bhagwati (1977, p. 491) reminded us, are 'the result of an interaction between the country's own endowments and demands and the rest-of-the-world's endowments and demands', a fact apparently not accounted for in the Chenery patterns. The challenge, therefore, would be, instead, to assess 'the ability of an economy to reach its full potential, that is, to come close to optimal growth' (Williamson 1986) . Another line of criticism relates to the econometric approach as causality may run in either direction: from the level of per capita income to the structural variable or vice-versa (Branson et al. 1998 ).
In the development patterns, however, there is no implication that a single unique path, through which all economies have to pass, have to exist. On the contrary, Chenery and his associates were always aware that, by treating development within a uniform framework, systematic differences in development patterns among nations would be identified. 13 In fact, they distinguish between two components of a country's pattern of development: the normal effect of universal factors (that accounts for most of the observed structural variation among countries) and the effects of a country's individual history (that can be more readily evaluated after allowing for the uniform elements in each development pattern) (Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 5) .
Nonetheless, the only feasible way to approach historical reality, as Gerschenkron (1962) wrote, is through the search for certain regularities or uniformities, and the analysis of deviations to the norm. Since development occurs with sufficient uniformity among countries to produce a consistent pattern of change in 12 Cf. for instance, Díaz Alejandro (1976) and Perkins (1981) . Williamson (1986) wrote, "in uncritical moments we tend to gauge an economy's performance by its ability to replicate or even exceed those stylized patterns". 13 As Chenery (1988, p. 60) put it, "the search for uniform features of development almost inevitably leads to a division of countries into more homogeneous groups". 5 resource allocation, factor use, and other structural features as the level of per capita income rises, a set of basic processes only restricted by the lack of empirical evidence has been selected 14 . All variables are expressed as shares (of GDP, total employment, etc.) since it is the relative variation which determines structural change. Shares are calculated at nominal prices since the decisions of individuals and firms are more meaningfully analysed at current, rather than at constant, prices. The development processes studied can be divided into three main categories: a) accumulation, that deals with the resources used to increase an economy's productive capacity, for which we have gathered information on stocks (literacy) and on increases in stocks (gross domestic investment and school enrolment); b) resource allocation, which interacting with accumulation, produces systematic changes in the composition of domestic demand, foreign trade, production, and employment, as real product per head rises 15 ; c) demographic transition. Here they are summarized:
1. Domestic Demand (percentage of GDP): gross domestic investment, private consumption, and government consumption.
2. Education: primary and secondary school enrolment (percentage of population aged 5 to 19) and literacy (percentage of population over 7 years old). 6. Urbanization (percentage of population in towns over 20,000 inhabitants).
7. Demographic transition: crude birth and death rates (per thousand inhabitants), gross fertility (children per woman), infant mortality (per thousand births), net fertility 16 .
Data on structural change across Europe have been gathered mostly from national sources, in particular, from reconstructed national accounts (see Appendix on sources) for three year averages around years ending in 0 up to 1900; then, for significant benchmarks in the Interwar period (1913, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1938) and for years ending in 0 and 5 over 1950-90. A major feature of the data set is that non-market economies have been excluded given the conceptual and data problems involved 6 (different economic categories, low reliability, and, especially, a different set of incentives for economic agents).
GDP per head is expressed here in 1990 U.S. dollars (converted at the GearyKhamis purchasing power parity) and countries' series have been built by projecting backwards 1990 levels (calculated at international prices) with each country growth rates (estimated at national prices) and, regrettably, the resulting series suffer from a serious index number problem since their economic meaning weakens as we move away from the 1990 benchmark (Prados de la Escosura 2000).
Methodology
In this section the econometric methods used for the construction of patterns of development are exposed. We start from the method designed by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) , and since the statistical procedure has to be applied to a wide range of structural processes and countries, the scope for a more refined econometric specification is constrained by the availability of data. 17
In addition to confirming the existence of patterns of development common to modern Europe, a major goal of this essay is to separate the effects of universal factors, common to all countries, from particular characteristics of each one, in order to highlight national deviations from the European patterns of development. I, therefore, assume that any indicator of structural change, I it , for i= country, and t= time period, can be divided into two different parts:
where, ? is a k ? 1 vector of time and cross-country invariant parameters; U it is a vector of explanatory variables representing the level of development, market size, economies of scale, etc. in country i at period t; ? i is a time invariant but cross-country variant vector of parameters; and V it represents a set of explanatory variables, including a stochastic disturbance (which incorporates war, political unification, etc.). U it includes the explanatory variables in Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
where c is a constant term; Y it , real income per head; N it , population; INFL it , net imports as a share of GDP; Size i , country i's extension in square kilometres; TREND t , time trend dummy. 7 Under these conditions, f 1 ( ? ,U it ) will be the part of the structural variable I it that can be explained by the pattern of development common to all countries, while the divergence of country i from the pattern will be f 2 (? i ,V it ). Then, assuming that ? exists amounts to accepting that a common pattern does exist. Next the necessary assumptions to estimate the patterns of development properly have to be established. I have preferred the semi-log to the double-log formulation in order to retain the additive property for the different components of aggregates (i.e., sectoral shares of output must add to 100). In addition, it will be assumed that f 1 ( ? ,U it )= ? *U it . Under these conditions, we have: Table 1 .
Regression Analysis
The econometric results for both single and adjusted patterns, presented in the Appendix, deserve some comments. The main finding is that existence of patterns of development common to modern European countries appears to be confirmed. Adjusted R squared and statistical tests indicate so. If accumulation and resource allocation processes are examined we can find, for example, that as regards the composition of demand, both coefficients of income and population present the expected sign, as income is negatively related to consumption (total and private) and positively to domestic investment, while the opposite occurs to population. Size and trend dummies also correlate positively to investment and negatively to consumption (only to private consumption for the time trend). Larger countries appear to invest more at given levels of income and investment rates increase as time goes by, regardless of income (while the opposite happens to private consumption). In the adjusted patterns, a dummy variable for the slope of LnY in different periods allow us to locate structural breaks,
essay. For such a reason, I finally decided to assume the lack of correlation between U it and V it , and to go on with the initial specification. 19 The choice of 1990 as the end year in this investigation is due to the fact that the demise of communism in Europe changed borders and was followed by a transition to the market in central and eastern European countries that have not been taken on board while they were command economies and accumulation and resource allocation were not ruled by market forces. Thus, this paper cover the late nineteenth century (1850-1913) and, to use Hobsbawn's expression, 'the short' twentieth century . Table 2 presents the structural transformation that occurs as real GDP per head grows. Simulations are provided for all development processes within an income range from 1,000 to 12,000 dollars (at 1990 'international' prices (PPP)), when most of the transition from a pre-industrial to a modern society occurs. Three development processes are considered, i.e., accumulation, resource allocation, and demographic transition. Together with the normal structural cha nge associated to a rise in GDP per head, growth elasticities have been computed for given levels of per capita income and its changes (Table 3) .
Normal Structural Variation with the Level of Development
Most development processes were half-completed at early stages of development, somewhere in between 3,000 and 4,000 dollars, and four-fifths of the transformation had occurred by a 8,000 dollar income 21 . The implication is that growth in post-World War II Europe, the period from where most economic theorists derived their stylised facts, is weakly related to resource allocation 22 .
In the accumulation process, proxies for physical and human capital have been considered. Information on GDP expenditure components permitted to derive net imports of goods and services as a residual which, in turn, proxied capital net inflow, and, as a result, to derive the rate of national saving (expressed as a share of GDP). The comparison between investment and saving suggests a life-cycle behaviour, in which domestic saving is lower than investment demand at initial levels of the trans ition, with the gap closing as income rises. In both cases, the share of GDP increases as income rises, multiplying over the total income range considered by a ratio of 3.5 in the case of saving (2.4 times up to $4,000, the mid-transition point), and by 2.8 in the case of investment (2.0 up to $4,000), that is, representing a gain of 16.3 percentage points for saving, and 14.7 for investment (9.1 and 8.2 by $4,000, when half the transition was completed). Proximate indices for human capital also show large increases, multiplying by 2 over the transition (1.6 by half of it), that is, up to 52.5 percentage points for literacy, and 33.8 for schooling, (29.3 and 18.8 up to $4,000).
Associated to growth, there are structural shifts in the allocation of resources.
Resource allocation interacts with factor endowments, economic policies and productivity growth to condition the path of development. We can analyse demand and supply changes separately. Overall consumption fell by 20 per cent throughout the transition (10 per cent when half of it was achieved), that is, declining from over 90 per cent of aggregate demand to around three-fourths. Trends in private and government consumption followed, however, opposite directions, while the former fell by 31 per cent, the latter rose by 188 per cent (-17 and 105 per cent, respectively, over the first half of the transition). In percentage points, the variations represent 27.3 percentage points of decline for private and 10.9 of rise for public consumption (-15.2 and 6.1 by half the transition).
On the supply side, a decline occurs in agriculture's shares in output and employment, while, for industry and services, there is an increase. It is worth mentioning that absolute increases are more noticeably in the shares of services (28.8 and 38.7 percentage points gained for output and employment, respectively, over the transition) than for industry (12.1 and 17.1, respectively), in particular, at higher income levels (over $4,000). Agriculture's supremacy in output and employment disappears by $3,000, and $4,000, respectively. Interestingly enough, the proportional change implied by the transition differs from output to employment. It means that relative (average) labour productivity (that is, the ratio of each sector's share in output to that in employment) differs across sectors and, consequently, that efficiency improvements in the use of labour do not proceed at the same pace across sectors. In agriculture, a sharper decline can be noticed for its output's share (-41.1 percentage points) than for its 12 do not allow me to address differentials in marginal productivity. A caveat to be made about relative labour productivity derives from the weakness of statistical data for employment in agriculture. In fact, at lower income levels, when the divisio n of labour is not widely diffused yet, figures for economically active population in agriculture (the main historical source for employment) tend to be over-exaggerated, as part-time labourers in industry and services tend to register under their main professions, e.g., farmers and, hence, figures for industry and services understated 24 .
The share of population living in towns over 20,000 inhabitants is the arbitrary threshold used here to assess the degree of urbanization. A rapid increase in urbanization takes place as income rises. A multiplier of 3.9 applies for the entire transition (2.6 for half of it), representing a 36 percentage point rise (20 up to $4,000).
Besides, a decline in the proportion of agricultural labour within rural population (measured as the ratio of the agricultural share in total employment to the rural share in total population) occurs as GDP per head improves, suggesting that people living in the countryside tends to work increasingly outside agriculture as economic growth proceeds (from three quarters to one-fifth over the transition). Manufactured exports overcome those of primary goods around $4,000 of income.
Meanwhile, industry's share in GDP becomes larger than agriculture's at $3,000. Such a lag suggests that, in Europe, the emergence of a domestic market for industrial goods is previous to that of foreign markets.
Finally, the demographic transition suggests a decline in both natality and mortality, in which the former experienced a deeper absolute fall, with the result of a slowing down in the rate of natural increase (by 6.6 percentage points), as income per head improves. Meanwhile, a decline in gross fertility is softened in net terms by the more rapid reduction in infant mortality.
So far only tendencies have been pointed out. Table 3 provides a more precise measurement of the responsiveness of structural transformation to changes in GDP per head for each development process. Elasticities have been computed both at a given level of per capita income (point estimates) and for income changes (discrete estimates), covering most of the transition from a pre-industrial into a modern economy. It appears that, in both estimates, the lower the income level, the higher the value of the coefficient for growth elasticity, with the exception of those cases in which a negative relationship exists, where the opposite occurs. Differences in the structural response to increases in income are worth noticing. Both measures of (absolute) elasticities are higher, at low income levels, for investment and government consumption, the share of services in total employment and urbanization and manufactured exports, while the opposite occurs for agriculture's shares in output and employment, fertility (gross and net), infant mortality and crude birth and death rates.
Early Starters and Latecomers
Up to this point, the discussion has been carried out on the basis of development patterns common to Modern Europe over one and a half centuries. However, when one and a half centuries is being considered, distinctive structural behaviour at different historical periods should be expected. The adjusted patterns of development allow for historical differences in structural change across different phases (up to World War I, in the Interwar years, and in the post-World War II era) and, therefore, help to distinguishing the features of early starters and late comers. A similar approach to the one used in the construction of average single patterns has been followed for the adjusted patterns. Table 4 presents the patterns, while growth elasticities appear in Table   5 . For the sake of simplicity, only the $1,000-$4,000 income range has been considered as, actually, most European countries had not reached the upper level by 1913.
Gerschenkron provided a set of propositions that can be tested with the help of the adjusted development patterns. Thus, he asserted that, the more backwards a country is, a) the faster the growth of industrial output; b) more intense the stress on bigness of both industrial plant and enterprise; c) the greater the stress upon producers' goods; d) the stronger the pressure on private consumption levels; e) the greater the role of institutional factors in promoting industrialization (banks, the State), and f) the less 14 active the role of agriculture in industrialization, that is, its provision of a market for industry by rising labour productivity (Gerschenkron 1962, pp. 353-54) . 25
Unfortunately, only some of Gerschenkron's hypotheses about European development can be subjected to quantitative testing: The evidence presented here provides an empirical test if we associate proposition a), to the size (and the increases)
in the share of industry in output and employment; hypotheses b), c) and d) to the shares of GDP allocated to investment and private consumption, respectively;
proposition e), to the share of GDP assigned to government consumption, and, finally, hypothesis f) to the productivity gap and the relative size of agriculture in GDP and labour force.
From the comparison between Pre-World War I and the average single patterns of development for 19th and 20th centuries some interesting findings can be reported.
As regards propositions b) and c), accumulation in both human and physical capital proceeded at a different pace before the Great War (Table 4) ; it was larger at low income levels and smaller at high ones, i.e., pre-1914 investment was higher below a per capita income of $2,000, as it was the case of literacy and schooling below a $3,000
income. Thus, the lower investment rates in physical and human capital for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century provides support to Gerschenkron's content ion of latecomers' emphasis on producers' goods.
Differences observed for resource allocation processes offer an answer to propositions d) and e). Thus, the composition of expenditure prior to World War I points to a higher (overall) consumption over $2,000, with the share of private consumption larger and that of government consumption smaller above $1,000. It means that early starters suffer from a lower pressure on private consumption while the size of Government, usually correlated to its activist role, was smaller, as
Gerschenkron's asserted.
The supply side shows noticeable differences for the pre-1914 patterns and provides responses to propositions a) and f). Before the Great War, European agriculture presents a larger size of GDP for any income level, and a smaller labour force over a $1,000 income, than the average single pattern. As a result, a lower productivity gap emerges, which tends to close as income rises. In other words, early starters exhibit a smaller agriculture in terms of employment and a larger size in terms of output and, hence, relative average labour productivity in agriculture was higher than in the case of the late comers. The lagged shift of labour out of agriculture and its higher 25 A critical assessment of Gerschenkron's views can be found in O'Brien (1986). Gerschenkron's views are examined in the light of research during the late twentieth century in Sylla and Toniolo (1992).
productivity gap confirm Gerschenkron's (1962) contention that late comers' agriculture had a less active role in economic growth.
Industry and services lower shares in GDP (the latter up to $3,000) and higher ones in employment (over $1,000 in the case of industry) complete a more balanced labour allocation prior to the Great War. Besides, a more urbanized society and a smaller proportion of its rural population involved in agricultural activities appears above $2,000 in the pre-World War I patterns. However, in the case of the latecomers, the relative size of industrial output grew faster within the same income range, supporting Gerschenkron's contention of more intense industrial growth in the case of latecomers.
Differences in international trade also appear between average and pre-World War I patterns of development, as the latter exhibits a more open economy over $1,000
in which the larger share of manufacturing exports reveals its comparative advantage.
The systematic commodity trade surplus in early starters in contrast with the deficit in latecomers (that emerges from the average, single, pattern) points to a higher investment demand than domestic saving in the case of latecomers while the opposite appears to occur in that of early starters (nineteenth century Britain and France provide good examples) (Imlah, 1958; Lévy-Leboyer, 1978 ).
Higher birth and death rates, and lower population pressure below $4,000, plus higher fertility and infant mortality, are the main demographic differences for pre-1914
Europe when compared with average, single patterns.
Comparing growth elasticities for each structural variable at given income levels, or as income increases for different historical phases, is most illuminating.
Values (in absolute terms) for both measures of elasticity for the pre-World War I era are shown in Table 5 . The comparison with those of elasticities for the average patterns of development (Table 3) indicates that, in the income range $1,000-4,000 lower values are found for both the shares of investment and of industry in GDP. It might be suggested that such a result is associated to latecomers' catching up with early starters and lends support to Gerschenkron's propositions a), b), and c). Nonetheless, larger growth elasticity for human capital formation and for openness, two ingredients of successful industrialization, are exhibited in the pre-World War I patterns. Moreover, a much lower value of the growth elasticity for Government consumption in early starters tends to confirm the idea of the State's stronger stand in latecomers. Finally, the higher (absolute) value of the growth elasticity for the agricultural share in employment and for the urbanization rate among the early starters reinforces the view of a less dynamic rural sector in the case of latecomers. It can be inferred, then, that Gerschenkron's stylised patterns of European development are not rejected by the empirical evidence provided here.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper European development patterns that associate structural change to variations in GDP per head and population have been examined in historical perspective. Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing regularities of growth since its nations share a common set of institutions, policies, and resource endowments. Some lessons can be derived.
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